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On the precise point in issue, the case is nearly barren of any decisional
support, although it is not exactly unheard of for a court to disregard the
usual method of applying the state statute of limitations in order to
achieve uniformity within a federal statute. 2° This court reaches a desirable
result by attempting to elucidate with general propositions and sheer logic
one section of the very confused mosaic that represents this area of the
federal labor law.
J. NORMAN BAKER
Labor Law--Secondary Boycotts—§ 8 (b) (4) (i) (B) Inducements to
"any individual"—Lower Level Supervisors.—NLRB v. Local 294,
Teamsters Union (Van Transport Lines, Inc.). 1—A controversy arose
between the union and Van Transport Lines, Inc., an interstate carrier, when
the latter refused to comply with an arbitration award reinstating a truck-
driver. A strike of the remaining drivers was called and customers of Van
were approached and asked "to cooperate." Employees of these customers
were also solicited "not to ship by Van," not to "use Van for the purpose of
future routing" and, in one instance, not to accept freight of Van already
unloaded. Those solicited included, in addition to rank-and-file employees,
minor supervisors in charge of shipping and routing and a shipping foreman.
The NLRB held2 that these inducements and encouragements addressed to
the employees and minor supervisors employed by customers of Van were
in the nature of a secondary boycott in violation of section 8(b) (4) (i) (B)
of the National Labor Relations Act.° On petition of the NLRB to enforce
the order requiring the union to cease and desist from continuing the unfair
labor practices, enforcement was granted. HELD: It is a violation of sec-
tion 8(b) (4) (i)(B) to make inducements and encouragements addressed to
20 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1942), where in a suit by
the U.S. Government concerning forced commercial paper of the United States, the
Court denied that a state statute of limitations should apply because "the desirability
of a uniform law is plain."
1 — F.2d —, 49 L.R.R.M. 2315 (2d Cir. 1961).
2 Local 294, Teamsters Union (Van Transport Lines, Inc.), 131 N.L.R.B. No. 42, 48
L.R.R.M. 1026 (1961).
3 8(b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(4).(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or com-
modities or to perform any services; where . .. an object thereof is—(emphasis
added)
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transport-
ing, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person.
NLRA, 61 Stat. 140 g 8(b) (4) (B) (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (1958), as amended,
73 Stat. 542 § 704(4) (i) (B) (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (i) (B) (Supp. 1958).
546
CASE NOTES
rank-and-file employees and minor supervisors, such as those in charge of
shipping and routing operations and the shipping foreman.
There are three general categories of individuals which a court has to
consider in applying 8(b)(4). These include high level management, ordinary
employees, and supervisors. This last group has presented the greatest dif-
ficulty both to the NLRB and to the courts. The problem is that the act
divides these people into only two categories: (1) "any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce"; 4
and (2) "any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting com-
merce."'
The instant court reiterated that mere inducements and encouragements
addressed to high level management did not constitute an unfair labor prac-
tice in violation of section 8(b) (4) (1) (B). 6 The union contended that those
addressed in the present controversy fit within this category since they were
supervisors. The court stated, however, that a finding that the individuals
were "supervisors," as defined in the act, 7 would not be determinative, since
certain supervisors might well be embraced by the words "any individual
employed by any person." The court then concluded that the supervisors in
question were clearly within the terms "any individual employed by any
person" and that, therefore, the inducements and encouragements addressed
to them did constitute a violation of section 8(b) (4) (i) (B). This conclusion
resulted from consideration of a statement delineating "minor supervisors"
in an earlier NLRB decision 9
 and a conclusion that the 1959 amendments
4 Id.
5
 8(b). It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents—
(4) (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where an object thereof is—(emphasis added)
(B) forcing or requiring ... .
0
 This had already been held in Alpert v. Local 379, Teamsters Union, 184 F. Supp.
558, 46 L.R.R.M. 2319 (D.C. Mass. 1960), and is entirely logical, since 8(b)(4)(ii), prin-
cipally applicable to those considered to be in management positions, requires threats,
coercion or restraints.
7
 The term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the interest
of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, or discipline other employees, or responsibility to direct them, or to
adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connec-
tion with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely
routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
61 Stat. 137 (1947, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1958).
8
 In Amalgamated Meat Cutters, AFL-CIO (Peyton Packing Co.), 131 N.L.R.B.
No. 57, 48 L.R.R.M. 1048 (1961), the Board had similarly stated that,
Concerning the . . . employees who were allegedly induced, the record contains
no more than the naked stipulation of the parties that each is a "supervisor"
within the meaning of the Act and during the normal course of his employment
purchases the meat supplies. . . There is no evidence . . . which we might use
to make the determination we deem basic to the disposition of the complaint
in this case, namely, whether either of the supervisors herein is an "individual
employed by any person" within the meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (i) (B).
9 . . although they are managements' representatives at a low level, [they]
are through their work, associations, and interests, still closely aligned with
those whom they direct and oversee.
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to the NLRA were intended to plug the "illogical loophole" previously
present," by including certain supervisors within section 8(b) (4)(i) and
others within section 8(b) (4) (ii).
This distinction between upper level supervisors and lower level super-
visors is often difficult to make. A 1960 district court case in Massachusetts
stated:
[Section] 8(b) (4) (i) is concerned with appeals addressed to those
who perform services manually or clerically, or who manually use
goods, or who have minor supervisory functions. It does not cover
appeals to those who on behalf of their employer have power law-
fully to terminate, cease, or otherwise control business relations with
the so-called primary employer. 11 (Emphasis added.)
In that case a superintendent with power to hire, fire, hear grievances, to
handle routine sub-contract problems and to terminate a sub-contract was
held not to be an "individual." The NLRB has a term which it uses to
exclude supervisors from the category of "individuals employed by any
person." It is "top management representative on the job."" This is never
the sole test, however, and some type of authority or policy-making ability"
is almost always a prerequisite. 14 The Board has stated that:
Local 505, Teamsters Union (Carolina Lumber Co.), 130 N.L.R.B. 1438, 1443, 47
L.R.R.M. 1502, 1505 (1961).
10
 The words "any individual employed by any person" replaced the words "em-
ployees of any employer" and the words "any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce" replaced the words "any employer or self-employed person"
in 1959. Prior to that time supervisors were not considered to be "employees of any
employer" or "any employer or self-employed person" and so were not covered by the
act under either section. This was the "illogical loophole" referred to.
11 Supra note 6, 184 F. Supp. at 561, 46 L.R.R.M. at 2321.
12
 See Local 324, Operating Engineers Union (Brewer's City Coal Dock), 131
N.L.R.B. No. 36, 48 L.R.R.M. 1013 (1961) and Local 299, Sheet Metal Workers Union
(S. M. Kisner & Sons), 131 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 48 L.R.R.M. 1226 (1961). Obviously this
is not the only prerequisite for being classified as an "individual." In both cases the
supervisors had the authority to make independent policy judgments. In the latter
case, an "estimator" with duties including taking jobs off prints, pricing them up
and placing employees on the job was held to have limited authority and to be within
the category of an "individual."
13 See the Board ruling in Local 61, Upholsterers Union (Minneapolis House
Furnishing Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 48 L.R.R.M. 1301 (1961), where super-
visors with authority to determine purchasing or selling policies of their stores without
referring to their supervisors or with authority to influence such policies were held not
to be "individuals," since their tasks were considered to be managerial functions affecting
the employer's relationship with outsiders.
14 See the interesting Board rulings in Local 537, Teamsters Union (Lohman Sales
Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. No. 67, 48 L.R.R.M. 1429 (1961), where a cashier, two store man-
agers and a drug department manager were held pro forma to be "individuals" because
of a failure of the union to except to the Trial Examiner's finding and Local 848,
Wholesale Delivery Drivers and Salesmen's Union (Servette, Inc.), 133 N.L.R.B. No. 152,
49 L.R.R.M. 1028 (1961), where the Board stated, "We agree with the Trial Examiner's
conclusion that the appeals to the various store managers . . did not constitute a




It will . . . be necessary in each case . . . to examine such factors as
the organizational setup of the company, the authority, respon-
sibility, and background of the supervisors, and their working con-
ditions, duties and functions on the job involved in the dispute,
salary, earnings, prerequisites and benefits. No single factor will be
determinative. 15
In addition to these tests, it would seem useful to determine whether a
particular supervisor has the ability, on behalf of management, to commend,
reward, reprimand, or punish employees for their performance. This distinc-
tion between upper-level and lower-level supervisors seems to be a reasonable
and necessary one in light of the purpose of the act to prevent secondary
boycotts. It appears that supervisors of the lower echelon would, in all like-
lihood, have interests more apt to coincide with other workers than with
management. Moreover, it is apparent that solicitations to them to aid in
a strike would be more likely to fall on receptive ears than would pleas
addressed to management. It has been the policy of the NLRB, and ap-
parently of the courts in enforcing the Board's orders, to place lower-level
supervisors, as determined by the tests previously set out, within the category
of "individuals." The Van decision thus appears to have properly applied
the 1959 amendments to the National Labor Relations Act in the light of
prior authority and the realities of the labor-management arena.
It is interesting to note that when the Board considered the Van case
it concluded that an independent contracting trucker, who owned his own
freight terminal, and who operated a trucking service for one of Van's
customers, was not an "individual" under section 8(b) (4) (i), but a "person"
under section 8(b)(4)(ii). The trucker's business was conducted entirely
with such customer and the Board reasoned that, since his independence
was somewhat compromised by this exclusiveness, he was an "agent," and
since the act equates agents with their employers, he is a "person" and not
an "individual." In a prior case," the Board had stated that four self-
employed carpenters, who were independent contractors, were not "indi-
viduals employed by any person," since they worked for themselves. It
would thus appear that an independent contractor must always be a
"person," either in his own right, as were the carpenters, or by virtue of
his "agency" relationship, as was the truckdriver.
The tests used to separate supervisors into the categories provided by
the act speak only in terms of authority and control; sympathy with man-
agement or labor is not a relevant factor. Yet the total effect of the tests
permitted is to divide the supervisors according to sympathy as surely as if
sympathy were in fact the ultimate measure. Thus adverse interests are
. . . were not 'individuals' as that term is used in section 8(b) (4) (1) (B). We do so,
however, only for the reasons set forth in the Carolina Lumber Co. and Minneapolis
House Furnishing Co. cases." Is the Board retreating from prior conclusions?
15 Supra note 9, 130 N.L.R.E. at 1444, 41 L.R.R.M. at 1505.
16
 Local 1921, Carpenters Union (Spar Builders, Inc.), 131 N.L.R.B. No. 116, 48
L.R.R.M. 1182 (1961).
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brought into natural apposition. But the tests used to categorize a man as an
independent contractor do not with equal success result in the desired
apposition. As to him, a preexisting body of agency law is applied which
takes no account of the philosophy of the Labor Act. If such is the case,
might not sympathy be a proper test in the case of the independent con-
tractor? The Board has yet to go so far.
RICHARD L. FISHMAN
Negotiable Instruments—Forgery Insurance—Definition of Forgery as
a Policy Term.—ffome Federal Say. El Loan Ass'n v. Peerless Ins. Co.'
—Plaintiff savings and loan association brought an action in the United
States District Court in Iowa against defendant, a New Hampshire bonding
company, to recover under the forgery clause of a Savings and Loan Blanket
Bond (Standard Form No. 22). 2 A real estate agent, for a commission of
one percent, would aid persons who had purchased homes from him in
applying to plaintiff for loans. The agent submitted to plaintiff fraudulent
loan applications upon the basis of which plaintiff's officers issued five checks
payable to the fictitious applicants. 3 The checks were indorsed by the agent
in the names of the payees and were charged to the plaintiff's account by
the payor bank. By judicial interpretation in Iowa, an act must change the
legal efficacy of an instrument in order to constitute a forgery. Relying
upon section 541 of the Iowa Code, which makes such checks bearer paper,
defendant claimed that since the indorsements by the agent did not change
the legal efficacy of the instruments, being mere surplusage on bearer paper,
the loss was not covered by the forgery clause of the bond.' The District
Court rejected the defendant's contentions and allowed recovery. HELD:
(1) The loss was sustained through acts amounting to forgery under a
general commercial definition of that word; (2) recovery is not limited to
losses sustained through acts amounting to forgery as defined by the local
criminal law, but even if so limited, the acts here meet that standard;
(3) defendant's reliance upon section 541 in his denial of forgery loss,
1 197 F. Supp. 428 (N.D. Iowa 1961).
2 The policy provided, "The Losses Covered By This Bond Are As Follows .. .
Forgery Or Alteration. 2. Any loss through forgery or alteration of, on, or in any
instrument."
3 One of the names was that of a person in existence, but since he was not intended
to have any interest therein, he is deemed a fictitious payee nonetheless. Britton, Bills
and Notes § 149 (1953). The UCC has eliminated as misleading the words "fictitious
or nonexisting person," since the existence or nonexistence of the named payee is im-
portant only as it may bear on the intent that he shall have no interest in the instrument.
UCC § 3-405, Comment 1.
4 Iowa Code § 541.9(3) (1958), corresponds to NIL § 9(3) and reads as follows:
The instrument is payable to bearer:
.	 .	 .
3. When it is payable to the order of a fictitious or nonexisting or living person
not intended to have any interest in it, and such fact was known to the person
making it so payable, or known to his employee or other agent who supplies
the name of such payee . .
550
